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SEEKING PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
IN NCAA INFRACTIONS PROCEDURES:
STATES TAKE ACTION
I. INTRODUCTION
The National Collegiate Athletic Association ("NCAA") was formed in
19121 and has sanctioned colleges and universities since 1952.2 Until very
recently it seemed that schools dissatisfied with NCAA decisions would
have no recourse outside the NCAA system. Today, however, aggrieved
parties are fighting to impose mandatory procedural due process standards
upon the NCAA. The NCAA claims that it grants fair procedures which
comport with constitutional requirements3 even though it should not be re-
quired to do so.
The NCAA is the monopoly of all intercollegiate sports.4 These sports
generate millions of dollars in revenues through the efforts of players who
may not lawfully be paid and coaches who become legendary in their com-
munities. The futures of these players and coaches depend upon their repu-
tations as winners, reputations which can be destroyed by alleged
infractions of NCAA rules.5
1. DON YAEGER, UNDUE PROCESS THE NCAA'S INJUSTICE FOR ALL 5 (1991). The Na-
tional Collegiate Athletic Association evolved from the Intercollegiate Athletic Association of the
United States which was formed on December 28, 1905. Id. The NCAA seal, on the other hand,
states that the founding year of the NCAA is 1906.
2. Id. at 271.
3. "'You'll find that the NCAA has more due process than any other all-volunteer institu-
tion, more than the ABA (American Bar Association), more than the AMA (American Medical
Association).'" Scott Homer, Schultz Denies Vendetta Against Tarkanian, PROPRIETARY TO
THE UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL, March 28, 1991, at Cl (quoting Dick Schultz, NCAA
Executive Director).
4. National collegiate athletic associations are unincorporated associations consisting of
public and private colleges and universities and are private monopolies that control inter-
collegiate athletics throughout the United States;
National collegiate athletic associations exercise great power over member institutions be-
cause of their monopolistic control over intercollegiate athletics and their power to bar
from intercollegiate competition those member institutions that do not comply with the
rules of the association; ....
1991 Nev. Stat. § 398 (from the "findings" section of the now enacted Nevada Assembly Bill 204).
The findings in the Nevada statute are virtually identical to the findings in due process statutes in
several other states.
5. "Substantial monetary loss, serious disruption of athletic programs and significant damage
to reputation and careers may result from the imposition of sanctions on a member institution, its
employees, student athletes, students or boosters for violations of its rules .... ." Id.
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Fairly run, NCAA infractions procedures are the means by which col-
legiate sports are kept "amateur" and honest. Unfairly run, NCAA infrac-
tions procedures are a tool by which careers are ruined in the pursuit of
power and wealth. It is imperative that NCAA proceedings be fair and
just.
II. NCAA LIABILITY AS A "STATE ACTOR"
A. The Investigation and Adjudication of Coach Tarkanian
After an extensive investigation by the NCAA Committee on Infrac-
tions ("Committee") of the University of Nevada-Las Vegas ("UNLV"), an
NCAA member, the Committee found thirty-eight violations of NCAA
rules by the UNLV basketball team.6 Ten of these violations were directly
attributed to UNLV's head basketball coach, Jerry "Tark the Shark"
Tarkanian ("Tarkanian").7 The most serious allegation against Tarkanian
was that he had not cooperated with the NCAA investigation.'
The Committee recommended a two year probation of UNLV's basket-
ball team and demanded that UNLV show cause why further sanctions
should not be imposed if UNLV did not suspend Tarkanian from his posi-
tion as head basketball coach.9
Tarkanian was suspended by UNLV and promptly brought suit in the
Nevada state courts against the NCAA and UNLV. 10 Tarkanian alleged
that he was deprived of liberty and property without due process of law as
6. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 181 (1988) [hereinafter
Tarkanian].
7. Id. at 186.
8. Id. at 187. The NCAA Enforcement Policies and Procedures explicitly allows for proceed-
ings where a member institution's representative fails to cooperate with an investigation. The
relevant rule may be found in NCAA Administrative Bylaw Article 32 § 3.11, which provides:
FAILURE TO COOPERATE. In the event that a representative of a member institution re-
fuses to submit relevant information to the committee or the enforcement staff upon re-
quest, an official inquiry may be filed with the institution alleging a violation of the
cooperative principles of the NCAA bylaws and enforcement procedures. Institutional
representatives may be requested to appear before the committee at the time the allegation
is considered.
NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION, 1991-92 NCAA MANUAL 437 (1991).
9. The UNLV conducted its own investigation and found that Tarkanian had not violated
any rules. However, rather than face further sanctions which could fundamentally damage
UNLV's basketball program, the UNLV president authorized the suspension of Tarkanian despite
the fact that Tarkanian, tenured, was not given adequate notice. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 179, 187-
88.
10. Id. at 181 (citing Tarkanian v. NCAA, 103 Nev. 331, 741 P.2d 1345 (1987), rev'd, 488
U.S. 179 (1988)).
1992]
MARQUEITE SPORTS LAW JOURNAL
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion11 which provides:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the priv-
ileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws. 12
Note that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits State, not individual,
action. Tarkanian argued that UNLV, a state university, delegated its au-
thority to the NCAA and that the NCAA, acting jointly with UNLV, was
engaged in traditional state action, thereby making the NCAA a "state ac-
tor" liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 which provides:13
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Colum-
bia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the depriva-
tion of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitu-
tion and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 14
This statute imposes liability only on persons who act "under color of"
state action.15 Therefore, for liability to attach it is required, in our present
context, that the NCAA be determined to be a "state actor". 6 "Individual
invasion of individual rights is not the subject matter of the [Fourteenth
Amendment]." 7 "Nearly all the Constitution's self-executing, and there-
fore judicially enforceable, guarantees of individual rights shield individuals
11. Id.
12. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
13. See generally Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179 (1988).
14. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
15. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1688 (1988).
16. See Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 182 (citing Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 838 (1982);
Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 928-35 (1982) (the under color of law requirement of
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) is equivalent to the state actor requirement)).
17. Burton v. Wilington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961) (quoting The Civil Rights
Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883)).
The Civil Rights Cases, the Supreme Court's first full dress treatment of the fourteenth
amendment's state action requirement, provides a noteworthy illustration of the role of an
affirmative theory of liberty in shaping the state action doctrine. The Civil Rights Act of
1875 declared illegal all racially motivated interference by private individuals with the ex-
ercise by other individuals of their right to make use of "the accommodations, advantages,
facilities, and privileges of inns, public conveyances, and theatres.... ." The court held this
statute to be unconstitutional on its face: congressional power under § 5 of the fourteenth
amendment, Justice Bradley's majority opinion concluded, was confined to enforcing § l's
prohibitions of "state action." Significantly, however, the Court did not deny Congress all
power to regulate private conduct under the fourteenth amendment. In some circum-
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only from government action. Accordingly, when litigants claim the pro-
tection of such guarantees, courts must first determine whether it is indeed
government action, state or federal, that the litigants are challenging." 8
After defeat in the Nevada state court system, 19 the United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari to the NCAA.2° Justice Stevens, writing
for a 5-4 majority, reversed the lower courts' rulings and held that the ac-
tions of the NCAA which led to the suspension of Tarkanian were not
"state action" and that Tarkanian, therefore, had no redress under the
Fourteenth Amendment via 42 U.S.C. § 1983.2"
B. The Legal Principle of Private Actor Liability
There are three tests used by the Supreme Court to determine when a
private organization is a state actor. First is the public function test to de-
termine whether the organization's conduct is of a type traditionally per-
formed by the state.22 Second is the state compulsion test to determine
whether the conduct is encouraged or required by the state.23 Third is the
nexus test to determine whether the entity is engaged in a partnership-like
relationship with the state.24
The UNLV is a state university and, therefore, a state actor which must
comply with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment when
sanctioning coaches and athletes. "Thus when UNLV notified Tarkanian
that he was being separated from all relations with the University's basket-
ball program, it acted under color of state law within the meaning of 42
U.S.C. § 1983. ''25 The Supreme Court, however, held that the NCAA was
not a state actor, thereby allowing the NCAA to apply sanctions against its
members which, in turn, affected the coaches and athletes serving those
members without the availability of the due process guarantee.26
stances, the majority opinion implied, a state's failure to regulate private conduct could
constitute "state action" justifying federal intervention.
TRIBE, supra note 15, at 1695 (footnotes omitted).
18. Id. at 1688 (footnotes omitted).
19. The trial court ruled in Tarkanian's favor, granting an injunction against disciplinary
action by NCAA and awarding attorneys' fees to Tarkanian. On appeal by NCAA, the Supreme
Court of Nevada affirmed NCAA's liability as a state actor under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Tarkanian v.
NCAA, 103 Nev. 331, 741 P.2d 1345 (1987), rev'd, 488 U.S. 179 (1988).
20. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 182.
21. Id. at 196-99.
22. See generally Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649
(1944); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932).
23. JOHN E. NOWAK ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1079 (3d ed. 1986).
24. See generally Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 172-73 (1972).
25. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 193.
26. See generally id. at 182-85.
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The NCAA is an association of over 1000 colleges and universities. 27 A
member institution can withdraw from the NCAA at any time. While re-
taining membership, an institution must obey the rules of the NCAA. An
institution which violates an NCAA rule will, after review by the NCAA,
suffer sanctions. The NCAA does not have the authority to sanction a
school's athlete or employee directly. However, the NCAA may, as in
Tarkanian's case, advise a school that it will suffer sanctions if an employee
or athlete is not sanctioned by the school in the manner recommended by
the NCAA.28
The NCAA has evolved into a monopoly that controls intercollegiate
athletic program regulation.29 It was that monopoly, often affecting state
schools, on which other courts based their opinions that the NCAA was a
state actor liable for violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.30 With the Supreme
Court's narrow construction of the state actor requirement in Lugar v. Ed-
mondson Oil Co., Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, Blum v. Yaretsky and, now,
NCAA v. Tarkanian,3 I the lower courts have begun ruling that the NCAA
is not a state actor.32 The Supreme Court's holding in NCAA v. Tarkanian,
however, does not grant the NCAA complete immunity from being deemed
a state actor.33 Future cases claiming that the NCAA is a state actor will
continue to be addressed on a case-by-case basis.34 However, Tarkanian
stands as an important decision permitting the NCAA to deprive athletes
and coaches of Fourteenth Amendment due process protection. 35  In
Tarkanian, the Court framed the issue as "whether UNLV's actions in
compliance with NCAA rules and recommendations turned NCAA con-
duct into state action."'36 An actor is engaged in state action when a state
creates the legal framework governing the conduct of the actor, delegates its
27. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION, 1989-90 NCAA ANNUAL REPORT
29 (1991).
28. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 194.
29. Leading Cases, 103 HARV. L. REv. 137, 195 (1989).
30. E.g., Howard University v. NCAA, 510 F.2d 213 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Parish v. NCAA, 506
F.2d 1028 (5th Cir. 1975).
31. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co. 457 U.S. 922, 928-35 (1982); Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457
U.S. 830, 838 (1982); Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982); Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179.
32. E.g., McCormack v. NCAA, 845 F.2d 1338 (5th Cir. 1988); Karmanos v. Baker, 816
F.2d 258 (6th Cir. 1987); Graham v. NCAA, 804 F.2d 953 (6th Cir. 1986).
33. See Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 203.
34. Id.
35. J. M. Schwartz, NCAA v. Tarkanian: State Action In Collegiate Athletics, 63 TuL. L.
REV. 1703, 1709-10 (1989).
36. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 193.
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authority to the actor, or knowingly accepts benefits derived from the un-
constitutional behavior of the actor.3 7
In Tarkanian, the Court held that UNLV, but not the NCAA, was a
state actor. It is interesting to note that the final act of suspending
Tarkanian was committed by a state actor-UNLV. The Court stepped
"through an analytical looking glass" to determine if the deprivation of
Tarkanian's due process rights was "fairly attributable to the state."3 That
issue turns on the nature of the state's relationship with the private institu-
tion. Thus, in Ludtke v. Kuhn,39 the United States District Court, Southern
District of New York, held that a female reporter denied access to the
locker room of the New York Yankees was entitled to protection under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. Although the Yankees are a private organization they be-
came a state actor due to their "symbiotic" relationship with the state.4° In
particular, the court emphasized that the Yankees leased a city owned sta-
dium.41 Ludtke has limited precedential value,42 but it demonstrates that a
private team's relationship to the state can make that team a state actor.
Important to determining whether the NCAA is a state actor at any
given time is the relationship between the NCAA and member schools and
how, through that relationship, the NCAA enacts regulations. The NCAA
rules are established by the collective membership of the NCAA, not by
state law. The Supreme Court in Tarkanian posited that if the NCAA's
membership was compiled from only one state and comprised primarily of
state schools, the NCAA would be a state actor.43 However, the breadth of
membership in the NCAA includes almost every state and the NCAA is
"independent of any particular state."'  The Supreme Court decided that
the small effect that UNLV had upon NCAA legislation was not enough to
establish that the NCAA was a Nevada state actor.
37. Id. at 192.
38. Id. at 193.
39. 461 F. Supp. 86 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
40. Id. at 93-96.
41. Id.
42. Ludtke was decided by the Federal Court for the Southern District of New York.
Neither the United States Supreme Court nor the Second Circuit Court of Appeals re-
viewed the Southern District Court's decision. Thus, the Ludtke decision has never been
the "law of the land." Therefore, other federal and state courts are not bound by the
rationale or the holding of Ludtke.
Gregory R. Lang, Locker Room Access: A Constitutional Prospective, FOR THE REcoRD (Na-
tional Sports Law Institute, Milwaukee, Wis.), Jan.-Feb. 1991, at 2, 8.
43. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 193 n.13.
44. Id. at 193.
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The Court in Tarkanian held that although UNLV, like most schools,
adopted the NCAA rules for its athletes and staff, that fact did not trans-
form the NCAA into a state actor because UNLV retained the power to
withdraw from the NCAA and formulate its own athletic rules.45 That is
comparable to the circumstances in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona I wherein
the United States Supreme Court held that the Arizona Supreme Court's
implementation of the American Bar Association Code, which had been
adopted by Arizona word for word, was state action. 7 That did not neces-
sarily make the American Bar Association ("ABA") a state actor because
Arizona voluntarily chose to adopt the ABA rules and retained the power
to invalidate them at any time. Similarly, UNLV's voluntary adoption of
NCAA rules did not make the NCAA a state actor.4"
The Court in Tarkanian also analyzed the question of whether the
NCAA could be classified as a state actor because it acted as an agent of
UNLV. 49 A state which delegates its authority to a private actor may cause
that party to become a state actor.50 For example, in West v. Atkins"1 the
United States Supreme Court held that a private physician employed in a
state prison was a state actor due to the delegation of state authority over
the prisoners' health to the physician. 2 The Tarkanian decision, however,
did not find that UNLV had delegated its authority over its employees to
the NCAA.53
A final point stressed by the Supreme Court in Tarkanian was a re-
sponse to the argument that the NCAA was engaged in conduct tradition-
ally performed by the state and should, therefore, be considered a state
actor.54 The regulation of sports is not a traditional state function.5 5 How-
45. In Tarkanian, the Court put great importance on the fact that membership in the NCAA
was voluntary. Because States were not forced to join and adhere to the rules of the NCAA, the
NCAA was not promulgating state rules. Rather, the NCAA was promulgating NCAA rules
which the State, through UNLV, chose to accept as its own. Id at 192-98.
46. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
47. Id.
48. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 195.
49. Id. at 195-96.
50. E.g., West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 (1988).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. The NCAA's authority only extended to imposing sanctions upon the university itself. In
addition, the NCAA and UNLV were not joint participants seeking mutual benefit. If anything,
the NCAA and UNLV were adversaries throughout the proceeding, the NCAA seeking to sanc-
tion Tarkanian with suspension and UNLV seeking to retain him as head basketball coach.
Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 180, 196.
54. Id. at 197.




ever, discipline of state employees, such as Tarkanian, has been considered
a traditional state function. 6 The Court held that the decision to discipline
Tarkanian arose from UNLV and was not "fairly attributable" to the
NCAA. 7 The fact that UNLV's other options were "unpalatable" does
not render the options unavailable. Therefore, UNLV had retained author-
ity over its employees."
The Court's holding that the NCAA was not a state actor rested pri-
marily upon the NCAA's inability to directly discipline a member school's
athlete or employee and the member's option to drop its NCAA member-
ship at any time.5 9 However, as Justice White notes in his dissenting opin-
ion, similar facts in Dennis v. Sparks did not preclude a finding of state
action." In Dennis, the Court observed that although an actor had the
option of withdrawing from a conspiracy with a judge, it had not exercised
that option and the conclusion that the actor was a state actor was
permissible."
The Supreme Court's emphasis on the availability of alternatives to
UNLV is unrealistic. 2 The UNLV basketball team raises as much as six
million dollars annually for UNLV. 3 This "big business" is important to
the UNLV budget.' To retain this big business, UNLV must remain a
member of the NCAA because "[m]embership in the NCAA is a prerequi-
site for institutions wishing to sponsor a major, well-rounded athletic pro-
gram."' 65 With the growing importance of NCAA level competition to a
school's overall prestige and income, even retaining Coach Tarkanian, the
'winningest coach in college basketball,' was not a realistic option in the
face of the NCAA's threat of two year's probation for UNLV's basketball
team. 6 The Court's reliance on this option to demonstrate that UNLV had
not delegated its authority is refuted by the facts. The UNLV did not want
to suspend Tarkanian, yet, at the NCAA's command, Tarkanian was sus-
pended. The Court's formal analysis found that the NCAA did not have
56. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 196-97.
57. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., Inc., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982).
58. See Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 198 n.19, 199 (and accompanying text).
59. Leading Cases, supra note 29, at 191.
60. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 200 (White, J., dissenting).
61. See generally id
62. See Schwartz, supra note 35, at 1709-10.
63. Bill Brubaker, The Shark-He Could Be A Fish Out Of Water, WASH. PoST, May 13,
1990, at D1.
64. See id.
65. Board of Regents v. NCAA, 546 F. Supp. 1276, 1288 (W.D. OkIa. 1982), modified, 707
F.2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1983), aff'd, 468 U.S. 85 (1986).
66. See Leading Cases, supra note 29, at 195-96.
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the power to suspend Tarkanian but, as a practical matter, that power
existed.67
The Court's decision ignores the essential role that states play in the
NCAA.68 Without the state schools' membership, the NCAA would lose
its monopoly over intercollegiate sports.69 The NCAA relies heavily upon
the membership of state schools.7" When a school violates an NCAA rule,
the NCAA is the means by which other members, including state schools,
force sanctions and compliance upon the offending institution. Thus, the
NCAA "involves states, both as makers of NCAA rules and as power bro-
kers to ensure compliance with those rules."7 The NCAA's unique fea-
tures, a mixed membership and a monopoly over state schools'
intercollegiate sports, should fulfill the state actor provisions of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983.72
The Court in Tarkanian failed to provide a clear method of evaluating
an organization such as the NCAA under the state actor provisions.73 That
failure will encourage further indecisive opinions in the lower courts on the
liability of the NCAA for violations of the due process guarantee.74 In ad-
dition, the power of the NCAA to have an employee suspended will still be
at issue in some cases because state schools are bound by 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983.71 The lack of finality in the Supreme Court's Tarkanian decision
leaves much to be desired and still at issue, certainly for the four
dissenters. 76
III. STATE DUE PROCESS STATUTES-WHAT PROCESS Is DUE
A. The Elements of Due Process Legislation
Protection of individual rights does not stop where the United States
Constitution does. State constitutions also protect these rights, sometimes
67. Id.
68. Id. at 196.
69. Id. at 195.
70. A unique feature of the NCAA is its mixed membership, made up of both private and
state institutions. Approximately one-half of the NCAA members are state schools. These state
schools are involved in both the formulation of the NCAA legislation and are subject to that
legislation. Id. at 192, 194.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 193.
73. Schwartz, supra note 35, at 1710.
74. Id.
75. Randy Harvey, Time May Not Change NCAA's Mind, L.A. TIMES, December 14, 1988,
at 3-1.
76. See id. It should be noted that two of those dissenters, Justice Brennan and Justice Mar-
shall, are no longer on the bench.
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more completely than the federal constitution." Both state legislatures and
the Congress7" have the power to create statutes that protect coaches and
players. The limit to such statutory authority is that the statutes must not
violate a provision of the federal or a state constitution. In addition, state
legislation may not conflict with constitutionally sound federal legislation.79
Recently, several state legislatures have proposed or passed legislation
calling for procedural due process by the NCAA. That legislation is not the
result of a recently formed perception that there is a need to protect the
due process rights of coaches, staff, and players. As early as 1977 a Con-
gressional report on the NCAA, under the auspices of Representative John
E. Moss, former Chairman of the United States House of Representatives
Subcommittee on Oversight and Foreign Commerce, stated that:
The picture is one of a sanctioning body with incredible power
which may affect the careers and ambitions of coaches and student
athletes, as well as the stature of virtually every institution of higher
education in this country. This power is exercised by the NCAA
without observance of what we all assume are minimal standards of
fairness. °
Universities, their staffs and their athletes responded with caution to
this congressional questioning of the NCAA sanctioning practices. Even
though Tarkanian took the NCAA to court in 1987 and individuals spoke
out against the NCAA's infractions procedures for many years, there was
no appeal to legislatures until recently.8" Now, however, the process of lob-
77. Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 75 (1980).
78. The power of the federal legislature to act has expanded tremendously in areas such as the
commerce clause. See generally NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). The
beginning of the trend to defer to the federal legislature with regard to commerce clause issues and
the dangers to employees was the overriding concern which called for congressional action. In
other areas, however, Congress is not granted constitutional power to act so pervasively. In these
areas of less concern, power to legislate remains with the individual states pursuant to the Tenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution. See U.S. CONST. amend. X.
79. The Tenth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides, "[t]he powers not
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved
to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X. Where Congress has failed to
act or has acted in a limited manner the state legislatures are not preempted from acting. The
states' authority is referred to as the "police power." Under the police power a state may legislate
for the "health, safety, morals and general welfare" of its people. NOWAK et al., supra note 23, at
335.
80. Organization For Understanding and Reform, Justice Denied 4 (1991) (Champaign, Ill.)
(quoting John E. Moss, U.S. House of Representatives).
81. Persons have sought support from legislatures on other NCAA issues. The "Student
Right to Know and Campus Crimes Act of 1990 (PL 101-542)," although successfully "whittled"
down by the NCAA, will provide high school student athletes with the graduation rates of univer-
sities. Memorandum from the Honorable T. McMillen to the Honorable J. Dingell, Chairman,
House Committee on Oversight and Investigations 2 (Feb. 1, 1991).
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bying legislatures has begun and NCAA procedural due process bills are
passing by large majorities." The number of states addressing the issue is
rapidly increasing.83 The design of such legislation is to require the NCAA
to grant certain procedural rights to the member-schools it investigates.
Nebraska was the first state to pass NCAA due process legislation when
Governor Kay Orr signed such a bill into law on February 1, 1990.84 Ne-
vada also passed a law requiring the NCAA to comport with due process in
April 1991.8' Florida and Illinois also passed such laws in 1991. The Kan-
sas Senate approved a bill in April 1991 and it will be considered by its
House in 1992. A bill was introduced into the California Senate on March
8, 1991 and is still pending. In South Carolina, a bill was introduced into
the Senate on January 8, 1991.86 In addition, similar due process bills were
introduced in Connecticut, New York, Minnesota and Ohio. 7 Kentucky
has finalized a draft of a bill that will be introduced in the near future.
Thus, twelve states may have NCAA procedural due process laws by 1993.
Congress has also begun to review the issue. On February 1, 1991, Rep-
resentative Tom McMillen 8 called for congressional hearings on the im-
pact of the NCAA on interstate commerce and higher education.89 That
movement was furthered by the NCAA's disregard of previous congres-
sional recommendations. In January 1979, the Congressional Subcommit-
tee on Investigations and Oversight recommended that the NCAA appoint
an independent committee which would review and assess "the entire
NCAA enforcement system."9 ° That independent committee was to report
its findings in January of 1980.91 Until very recently, however, the NCAA
made no effort to create such an independent review body. On May 1,
1991, Representative Towns92 introduced federal legislation, HR 2157,
82. Loren Tate, Legislators Across the Nation Bucking NCAA, THE NEws-GAZETTE, May 9,
1991, at Sports. "You wouldn't think 30 Florida senators or 36 Kansas senators would agree on
anything." Id.
83. See id.
84. Now codified as §§ 85-1201 to 85-1210 of the Nebraska Statutes and referred to as Article
12, Nebraska Collegiate Athletic Association Procedures Act.
85. Danny Robbins, Enforcement Power of NCAA To Be Topic For State Legislature, L.A.
TIMES, May 12, 1991, at C3; Organization For Understanding and Reform, Reforming the
NCAA, Summary of State Legislative Efforts 1-3 (1991) (Champaign, Ill.).
86. Id.
87. Id.; Letter from Daniel J. Tarkanian to the Author (June 28, 1991).
88. Fourth District of Maryland and member of the Knight Commission, which reviewed
intercollegiate athletics.
89. McMillen, supra note 81, at 4 (regarding congressional hearings on the NCAA).
90. Id. at 1.
91. Id.
92. Democrat for New York.
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which would require the NCAA to implement specific due process proce-
dures. That legislation is now being considered.93
Not all due process legislative efforts have been successful. Iowa's bill,
introduced in the House on March 11, 1991, died in committee. In Mis-
souri, such a measure, added as an amendment to a House bill in 1990, died
in a Senate committee.94
The controversy continues to rage in many legislative halls across the
nation with the prospect of significant effect on NCAA procedures.
B. The Function of Due Process Legislation
Each state's legislation varies to some degree95 but there are common
features. The University of Illinois, like schools in many states considering
due process legislation, underwent investigation by the NCAA.96 The Illi-
nois legislature drafted Bill 682 partly in response to that investigation.97
Section two of that Bill consists of findings by the Illinois General Assembly
that collegiate athletic associations are "essentially monopolies" with "great
leverage" over local institutions.9" The Bill was not explicitly directed at
the NCAA as the definition refers to the "collegiate athletic association"
generically. 99 There can be little doubt, however, what the Bill actually
sought to curtail. In presenting the Bill to the Judiciary Committee of the
Illinois House, Representative J. E. Miller stated that "the NCAA is a self-
regulated monopoly exercising significant control over the lives and finances
of individuals and institutions that are under public control."1 "0
93. Robbins, supra note 85, at C3.
94. Id.
95. The fact that state legislation varies is one of the chief concerns of the NCAA. The
question arises as to how the NCAA will be able to operate in the many states where each state
will hold the NCAA up to different standards. Judy Sweet, Legislative Actions Only Complicate
the NCAA's Task, USA TODAY, March 12, 1991, at 10C.
96. In February of 1990, the NCAA sent the University of Illinois its third letter of inquiry in
six years. That letter detailed eleven violations allegedly committed by the University of Illinois
basketball team. FRANcis X. DEALY, JR., WIN AT ANY CosT 175-76 (1990) (citing CHI. SUN-
TIMES, February 17, 1990).
97. See J. E. Miller, Co-Chair Government Committee, Statement before the Judiciary I
Committee Illinois House of Representatives, April 24, 1991, at 1-5.
98. H.B. 682 § 2(b), 87th Leg., 1991-92 Illinois.
99. H.B. 682 defines athletic associations as follows: "In this Act, 'collegiate athletic associa-
tion', 'athletic association', or 'association' means a collegiate athletic association that, in fact,
monopolizes all or any significant part of an intercollegiate athletic sport on a national level."
H.B. 682 § 3, 87th Leg., 1991-92 Illinois.
100. J. E. Miller, Co-Chair Government Committee, Statement before the Judiciary I Com-
mittee Illinois House of Representatives, April 24, 1991, at 5.
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By not specifically directing the legislation at the NCAA, the proposers
of such bills avoid two problems. The first problem is the possibility that
the NCAA could form a different association with a new name or that new
associations could develop the authority to dominate intercollegiate athlet-
ics. Under these circumstances new amendments would be needed to con-
trol the new institutions if procedural due process concerns continued. The
second problem is that, if legislation is directed specifically against the
NCAA, it might violate the NCAA's constitutional right to equal protec-
tion under the law. 10 1 A claim by the NCAA that it was denied equal pro-
tection would probably not succeed. The NCAA is not a member of a class
subject to discrimination01 and, therefore, courts would give deference to
enactments of the legislatures.10 3 However, by referring to collegiate ath-
letic associations generally, state legislatures hope to avoid such litigation.
C. The Notice Requirement of Due Process Legislation
Many of the current and proposed laws require the NCAA to give no-
tice to the accused. That requirement already exists under the NCAA
rules. For example, Nevada's new statute states that there must be a notice
of hearing. That "notice must include: (a) A statement of the time, place
and nature of the proceeding; (b) A reference to the particular rules gov-
erning the proceeding; and (c) A short and plain statement of the violations
alleged and the facts underlying the allegations." 1"
The NCAA does send an initial notification letter to institutions about
forthcoming official inquiry. That letter must, pursuant to NCAA rules,
contain the allegations against individuals, give the individuals an opportu-
nity to respond and notify the individuals of their right to have counsel
present when the committee considers the allegations.105 In addition, the
NCAA sends a separate letter to any individuals who may be affected by
101. "No state shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
102. Typical claims involve individuals who are legislated against on the basis of their race or
national origin and are looked upon with stricter scrutiny by the Court. See Strauder v. West
Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880) (invalidating a law prohibiting African-Americans from serving on
grand or petit juries); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (invalidating a law denying
laundry licenses to Chinese-Americans); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954) (invalidating a
law which discriminated against Mexican-American jurors).
103. The Supreme Court has adopted the "traditional test" in cases where there is no suspect
class. That test grants great latitude to legislatures. See New York Transit Authority v. Beazer,
440 U.S. 568 (1979) (permitting a law denying employment to persons receiving methadone
treatment).
104. 1991 Nev. Stat. § 398.155.
105. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION, supra note 8, at 438 (explicating
NCAA Administrative Bylaw Article 32 § 5.5).
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the investigation but who are not associated with the institution under in-
vestigation.1 ' An updated report is sent to the institution every six months
giving the status of the investigation.10 7 Thus, the NCAA's own procedures
effectively notify all interested parties. Separate state legislation is not nec-
essary on this point, although such legislation will ensure that the NCAA
does not remove or violate the notice requirements.
D. The Hearing, Representation and Recording Requirements
of Due Process Legislation
Illinois House Bill 682 requires a formal hearing before any penalty may
be imposed against an Illinois school.108 The findings of that hearing must
be "in writing" and supported by "clear and convincing evidence." '"19
Those requirements respond to allegations that NCAA investigators rely on
their handwritten notes as evidence.110 Indeed, present NCAA regulations
permit the recording of interviews only in limited circumstances. NCAA
Administrative Bylaw Article 32 § 3.8 provides:
It shall not be permissible for any individuals involved in interviews
conducted by the enforcement staff to record such interviews
through the use of a court reporter or other individuals or the use of
any mechanical device. However, it shall be permissible for all indi-
viduals involved in such interviews to take handwritten notes of the
proceedings. At the request of the enforcement staff, the committee
may grant permission to record an interview when information will
not be provided unless it is recorded and the information is not
otherwise available to the enforcement staff."'
Much of the criticism of the NCAA's procedures is a result of the above
rule. Publications by interested groups attack NCAA Administrative By-
law Article 32 § 3.8 as one of the major indications of the failure of the
NCAA to provide procedural due process.1 1 2 Legislative efforts would re-
106. Id. (explicating NCAA Administrative Bylaw Article 32 § 5.6).
107. Id. at 435 (explicating NCAA Administrative Bylaw Article 32 § 2.2.4.1 and § 2.2.4.2).
108. H.B. 682 § 4, 87th Leg., 1991-92 Illinois; S.B. 1104 § 6(1), 1991 Florida; 1991 Nev. Stat.
§ 398.155.
109. H.B. 682 § 4(b), 87th Leg., 1991-92 Illinois.
110. See Organization For Understanding and Reform, Ten Things You Should Know
About What the NCAA Calls "Justice", (1991) (Champaign, Ill.).
111. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION, supra note 8, at 436.
112. For example, a recent piece of literature by proponents of due process legislation states:
[Tihe accused aren't even facing an accurate written record of what their accusers said.
They must answer an investigator's hand-written summary of what the investigator
thought he or she heard. The accused is also prohibited from obtaining a copy of their
accuser's allegations....
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quire the NCAA to allow legal representation and to provide a certified
record of interviews of witnesses. As stated in Illinois House Bill 682:
[T]he person interrogated"1 a is entitled to have counsel present at
any further interrogation and need not respond further until pro-
vided with a reasonable time to obtain counsel. The person interro-
gated is entitled to a complete recording of any subsequent
interrogation and a transcript of the full interrogation made at the
expense of the association. The transcript shall be made by a certi-
fied Illinois court reporter." 4
Currently, the NCAA does grant individuals the right to representation
during some, but not all, interviews.115 Further, if an interview is on cam-
pus and the subject matter of that interview directly relates to the school,
the school may have its own representative at the interview.1 16 However, in
granting to persons being investigated the right to obtain a record of the
proceedings, the Illinois Bill directly contradicts NCAA Administrative
Bylaw Article 32 § 3.8 and therefore represents a new procedure with
which NCAA investigators would be obliged to comply.
Perhaps the most frequently cited problem with NCAA procedures is
the inability of the accused to cross-examine adverse witnesses. New legis-
lation grants the right to cross-examine through the imposition of state civil
rules of evidence upon the NCAA. The NCAA states that, without sub-
poena power, "'the NCAA couldn't compel a witness to appear.' "117 The
NCAA fears that if it is forced to allow cross-examination of its witnesses,
those witnesses will not be willing to testify."' On the other hand, pursu-
ant to NCAA Administrative Bylaw Article 32 § 3.7,119 the NCAA does
have the ability to grant immunity to some witnesses. As the NCAA itself
points out, there are no deep dark secrets as to who the witnesses are, and
Once you have given the NCAA a statement, you're not allowed to keep a copy of your
own statementl
Organization For Understanding and Reform, Ten Things You Should Know About What the
NCAA Calls "Justice", (1991) (Champaign, Ill.).
113. "Interrogated" is not defined by the Illinois House Bill 682. See Illinois H.B. 682, 87th
Leg., 1991-92 Illinois.
114. H.B. 682 § 6(b), 87th Leg., 1991-92 Illinois.
115. NCAA Administrative Bylaw Article 32 provides, "32.3.5 REPRESENTATION BY LEGAL
COUNSEL. When an enforcement staff member conducts an interview that may develop informa-
tion detrimental to the interests of the individual being questioned, that individual may be repre-
sented by personal legal counsel throughout the interview." NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC
ASSOCIATION, supra note 8, at 436.
116. Id. at 436 (delineating NCAA Administrative Bylaw Article 32 § 3.3.1).
117. Ed Sherman, Bill Governing NCAA Probes is a Waste of Time - and, if Passed, Money,
CHI. TRIB., May 12, 1991, at C13 (quoting Richard Hillard, a NCAA Director of Enforcement).
118. See id.
119. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION, supra note 8, at 436.
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the accused institution can request, but not compel, interviews with those
persons. 120 Finally, the NCAA itself is considering new rules that would
allow it to compel witnesses from any NCAA institution to testify and sanc-
tion those institutions that do not comply with ethical conduct
violations.1 21
The NCAA has the power to compel witnesses to testify. If the NCAA
will not allow witnesses to be cross-examined, those witnesses' statements
should not be considered evidence of an infraction. A witness' refusal to
testify is not a sufficient reason to forgo cross-examination. The imposition
of cross-examination will probably have little effect on a witness' willingness
to testify against a coach or institution. If it does, that witness is not credi-
ble enough to be allowed to testify.
A state's civil rules of evidence are often adopted by the new legisla-
tion. 1 22 This aspect of the legislation will create inconsistencies between
NCAA procedures in different states due to variances between states' rules
of evidence. Notable among the evidentiary provisions is the exclusion of
any evidence improperly obtained during an interview.1 23 Thus, the NCAA
must assure that it conducts its interviews within the bounds of each state's
requirements. Failure to do so causes the evidence obtained to be in-
admissable at the hearing. The fact that a transcript of all the testimony
was not made available to a party or that a party was not properly repre-
sented would nullify any information obtained during that interview.
The new legislation also places a limit on the time within which a pro-
ceeding may be brought by the NCAA against a school. 124 These "statutes
of limitations" reflect the NCAA's own requirement that allegations must,
with certain important exceptions, be made within four years of the
violation. 125
120. Robbins, supra note 85, at C3.
121. Mark Asher, NCAA Looks at Enforcement Changes, WASH. POST, November 20, 1991,
at B2.
122. H.B. 682 § 4(e), 87th Leg., 1991-92 Illinois; S.B. 1104 § 4(5), 1991 Florida; 1991 Nev.
Stat. § 398.225.
123. "Any individual or institution may suppress at the hearing any evidence garnered from
any interrogation of any party if the evidence was not procured in accordance with the provisions
of section 6 or if the evidence was obtained indirectly because of interrogations not in conformity
with the provisions of section 6." S.B. 1104 § 4(7), 1991 Florida.
124. H.B. 682 § 4(i), 87th Leg., 1991-92 Illinois; S.B. 1104 § 4(9), 1991 Florida.
125. STATUTE OF LIMrrATIONS. Allegations included in a letter of official inquiry shall be
limited to possible violations occurring not earlier than four years before the date the no-
tice of preliminary inquiry is forwarded to the institution. However, the following shall
not be subject to the four-year limitation:
(a) Allegations involving violations affecting the eligibility of a current student-athlete;
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The NCAA's four-year statute of limitations contains exceptions for al-
legations against current student-athletes, allegations demonstrating a pat-
tern of willful violation by the school, and allegations "that indicate a
blatant disregard for the [NCAA's] fundamental recruiting, extra-benefit,
academic or ethical-conduct regulations or that involve an effort to conceal
the occurrence of the violation. ' 126 Also, the NCAA's four-year statute of
limitations is tolled once the preliminary investigation begins."2 7 Thereaf-
ter, the only time limitation is that "[t]he enforcement staff shall make rea-
sonable efforts to process infractions matters in a timely manner."' 28 Thus,
in many instances a school can undergo an investigation although the
coaches and students involved have left the institution.1 29
During this indefinite investigation period, coaches and student-athletes
may find themselves restricted from athletic competitions or media expo-
sure, thus damaging their careers.' 30  States' statutes of limitations are
tolled once a claim is made. 131  These statutes of limitation, like the
NCAA's, allow a proceeding to continue for years after the initial claim.
(b) Allegations in a case in which information is developed to indicate a pattern of willful
violations on the part of the institution or individual involved, which began before but
continued into the four-year period, and
(c) Allegations that indicate a blatant disregard for the Association's fundamental recruit-
ing, extra-benefit, academic or ethical-conduct regulations or that involve an effort to con-
ceal the occurrence of the violation. In such cases, the enforcement staff shall have a one-
year period after the date information concerning the matter becomes available to the
NCAA to investigate and submit to the institution an official inquiry concerning the
matter.
NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION, supra note 8, at 438 (explicating NCAA Ad-
ministrative Bylaw Article 32 § 5.2).
126. Id.
127. Id. "Preliminary inquiries have lasted in excess of three years, allowing the NCAA to
bring charges against universities for up to seven years." Daniel Tarkanian, NCAA Enforcement
Procedures Do Not Afford Defendants Adequate Due Process Protection, FOR THE RECORD (Na-
tional Sports Law Institute, Milwaukee, Wis.), April-May 1991, at 4, 6.
128. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASsOCIATION, supra note 8, at 435 (explicating
NCAA Administrative Bylaw Article 32 § 2.2.1.4).
129. See Wint Winter, Jr., NCAA's Actions Affect too Many to Let it Operate Above the Law,
USA TODAY, March 5, 1991, at 10C.
130. While the damage to student-athletes' careers due to the actions of their predecessors is
not wholly within the scope of this article, it bears note. Often student-athletes will find that after
they have selected a school as a crucial step in their hope of becoming a professional athlete, that
school is sanctioned. If such sanctioning comes in the form of limited media exposure the student-
athlete will not be seen by professional recruiters. A coach, on the other hand, gains respect
through his or her team's overall success. Therefore, as long as the team plays the coach gains a
reputation. See id.
131. See, e.g., N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. [hereinafter C.P.L.R.] 215.3 (the one year New York




Recent state legislation places an additional requirement on NCAA investi-
gators beyond those requirements which a state law might ordinarily re-
quire for a tort claim.132 State due process statutes require the NCAA to
hold a hearing within a certain period of time in order to preserve its
claim. 133
E. The Appeal Process Requirements of Due Process Legislation
Legislative provisions for appeal will cause the greatest changes to
NCAA procedures. Under current NCAA rules, a school against which
sanctions are imposed has the right to appeal that decision.13 4 However,
that appeal is made to the very body that imposed the sanctions-the
NCAA.' 35 Never in the history of the NCAA has there been a successful
appeal of a major penalty.' 36 Thus, one author believes that the NCAA
operates as "judge, jury, and prosecutor."1 37 The NCAA institutes actions,
decides what evidence is proper, and makes the final decision in both the
first instance and on appeal. 38 Great criticism is directed at the NCAA for
this, but such procedures are not unusual in administrative areas.' 39 The
new legislation specifically grants coaches, athletes, and institutions the
right to appeal an NCAA decision to the state court system.' 4° This opens
the NCAA to the utmost scrutiny and will, undoubtedly, add greatly to the
NCAA's litigation costs.' 41
132. See id.
133. The proposed Illinois and Florida legislation would require that a hearing would be held
within nine months of the first notice to the school that it is under investigation. The time period
is extended to twelve months if the institution brings notice of the violation. H.B. 682 § 4(i), 87th
Leg., 1991-92 Illinois; S.B. 1104 § 4(9), 1991 Florida.
134. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC AssOCIATION, supra note 8, at 442 (explicating
NCAA Administrative Bylaw Article 32 § 8.1).
135. An appeal is made from the Infractions Committee to the "appropriate division steering
committee of the Council." Id.
136. Florida Legislature Acts on NCAA Due Process Bill, PR NEvswIRE, April 25, 1991.
137. Tom McMillen, March Madness Time in More Ways Than One, THE EVENING SUN,
March 19, 1991.
138. See id.
139. For example, the actions and appeal processes of state landmarking commissions have
been repeatedly attacked as biased and unconstitutional. E.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of
New York, 434 U.S. 983 (1978); St. Bartholomew's v. City of New York, 914 F.2d 348, 354 (2d
Cir. 1990); First Covenant Church of Seattle, Wash. v. City of Seattle, 114 Wash. 2d 392, 787
P.2d 1352 (1990), vacated, 111 S. Ct. 1097 (1991); Society of Jesus of New England v. Boston
Landmarks Comm'n, 409 Mass. 38, 564 N.E.2d 571 (1990).
140. H.B. 682 § 5(c), 87th Leg., 1991-92 Illinois; S.B. 1104 § 5(3), 1991 Florida; 1991 Nev.
Stat. § 398.215.
141. It should also be noted that the additional burden on the court system of a state will be
born by the citizens of that state.
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F The NCAA Response to Due Process Legislation
Perhaps the driving force behind efforts to pass due process legislation is
the effect of years of sanctioning and unavailing attempts to contest that
sanctioning. Over time, the NCAA has lost its opportunity to deny the
allegations of problems within its infractions process.
The only people who understand the abuses of NCAA "justice" are
those who have gone through it; but afterwards, their credibility and
motivation are suspect. The folks who haven't gone through an in-
vestigation-and are therefore more "credible"--don't understand
the problem and have nothing to say. The NCAA doesn't see a
problem at all. Pleased with its 100 percent conviction rate, it has
no reason to complain. So whom do you believe? The answer be-
came clearer only over time. If only a handful of those who had
suffered through an investigation questioned the quality of the
NCAA's work, they could be dismissed. When the same com-
plaints, though, came from dozens of schools, the pattern was troub-
ling. Maybe there was something to this chorus of complaints.
Maybe someone should listen. 142
It may be that the NCAA understands best how this conflict arose.' 43
As the NCAA repeatedly points out, the true culprit may not be the NCAA
executives but its member schools who should bring change from within the
NCAA.14 The members could cause such change by internal rule making
which would alter the procedural requirements for NCAA investigations.
Membership in the NCAA is indeed voluntary. 145 Nevertheless, proposers
of NCAA rules, which would require that NCAA investigations fulfill due
process requirements, assert that member institutions have lost control of
the organization.'"
142. YAEGER, supra note 1, at viii (1991).
143. "The NCAA states that it recognizes that sanctions and the investigative process have
been like a lightening rod - attracting much negative publicity not only to the NCAA but also to
the individual universities and college athletics in general." M. G. Gomez, Consultant to the
California Senate Committee On Business and Professionals, The NCAA: Disciplinary Actions and
Procedural Due Process, Prohibitions and Judicial Review, May 13, 1991, at 10.
144. Sherman, supra note 117, at C13; "'[We believe the (NCAA) members should change
the system, not the government.'" Robbins, supra note 85, at C3 (quoting David Price, Associate
Commissioner and Chief Compliance Officer of the Pacific 10 Conference).
145. NCAA rule § 3.1.2.
146. McMillen, supra note 81, at 4 (requesting congressional hearings on the NCAA).
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1. Special Committee to Review the NCAA Enforcement and
Infractions Process
The NCAA responded to the criticisms. In April 1991, the NCAA In-
fractions Committee, for the first time, authorized investigators to tape in-
terviews.14 7 Although it is not yet known how this will affect the overall
NCAA procedures, the taping of interviews is a significant step for the
NCAA. Further, NCAA Executive Director, Richard D. Schultz, re-
quested permission and was empowered by the NCAA Council to form a
committee to review the NCAA enforcement and infractions process. 48
The purpose of the review is to make sure that the enforcement and
infractions process is being handled in the most effective way, that
fair procedures and due process are guaranteed, that penalties are
appropriate and consistent, and also to determine ways to reduce the
time needed to conclude the investigation and infractions process
and to determine if there can be innovative changes that will make
the process more positive and understandable to those involved, as
well as to the general public. 149
That committee was chaired by Rex E. Lee 5 ° and included several
prominent members. 51 The report made, with commentary, eleven recom-
147. Robbins, supra note 85, at C3.
148. Committee Named to Review Enforcement Process, THE NCAA NEvS, April 10, 1991,
at 1.
149. Id (quoting NCAA Executive Director Richard D. Schultz).
150. Mr. Lee is the President of Brigham Young University. His appointment to the commit-
tee has been attacked even by those not in favor of due process legislation.
Lee, a former U.S. solicitor general, successfully argued the NCAA's case against
Tarkanian before the U.S. Supreme Court earlier this year. In fact, he was paid more than
$100,000 to defend the NCAA's current rules.... [W]ith so many capable candidates to
direct the group, Lee's appointment appears to be a clear conflict of interest. At the risk of
embarrassment, Schultz must remedy this situation immediately to ensure that the com-
mittee's work will be taken seriously.
Andrea Zani, Due Process Is Up to the NCAA, Not Law Makers, THE SPORTING NEWS, April 22,
1991, at 4.
151. The other committee members appointed were,
Warren E. Burger, former chief justice of the United States [Supreme Court]; Reuben V.
Anderson, a prominent Mississippi lawyer and former state supreme court justice; Morris
S. Anderson, U.S. district judge for the Western District of Arkansas; Charles Cavagnaro,
director of athletics at Memphis State University and a member of the NCAA Council;
Charles W. Ehrhardt, faculty athletics representative at Florida State University; Becky R.
French, general counsel for North Carolina State University; Robert R. Merhige Jr., senior
U.S. district judge for the Eastern District of Virginia; William M. Sangster, dean of the
college of engineering at Georgia Institute of Technology and a Council member, and Paul
R. Verkuil, president of the College of William and Mary.
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mendations 15 2 Those recommendations are a step in the right direction,
but they lack the strength of specificity. For example, the very controver-
sial point of allowing cross-examination was addressed in the report's ap-
pendix which the Committee, instead of presenting possible solutions,
dismissed as "simply beyond the NCAA's power to ensure since, as a pri-
vate association, it lacks subpoena power." '153
The NCAA should recognize that there is little value in evidence
presented by witnesses who are unwilling to be cross-examined. The right
to cross-examination should be a prerequisite for the use of direct examina-
tion as evidence. The Committee did make efforts to meet with several
third parties, including Tarkanian, but generally those consulted were cur-
rent or former NCAA employees.1 54 The Committee did not make specific
Committee Named to Review Enforcement Process, supra note 148, at 1.
The final report contains an altered list of the committee members. The final report does not
include the names of Morris S. Anderson and Robert R. Merhige, Jr. and adds as members,
Benjamen R. Civiletti of Baltimore, former U.S. Attorney General; Charles Renfrew of San Fran-
cisco, legal vice-president for Chevron Corporation, former Federal District Judge and a former
Deputy U.S. Attorney General; and Philip W. Tone of Chicago, a former Federal District Judge
and former Federal Appellate Court Judge. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION,
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO REVIEW THE NCAA EN-
FORCEMENT AND INFRACTIONS PROCESS 1 (Oct. 28, 1991).
152. 1. Enhance the adequacy of the initial notice of an impending investigation and
assure a personal visit by the enforcement staff with the institution's chief executive officer.
2. Establish a "summary disposition" procedure for treating major violations at a reason-
ably early stage in the investigation.
3. Liberalize the use of tape recordings and the availability of such recordings to involved
parties.
4. Use former judges and eminent legal authorities as hearing officers in cases involving
major violations and not resolved in the "summary disposition" process.
5. Hearings should be open to the greatest extent possible.
6. Provide transcripts of all infractions hearings to appropriate involved parties.
7. Refine and enhance the role of the Committee and establish a limited appellate process
beyond that committee.
8. Adopt a formal conflict-of-interest policy.
9. Expand the public reporting of infractions cases.
10. Make available a compilation of previous committee decisions.
11. Study the structure and procedures of the enforcement staff.
Id. at 3-8.
153. Id.
154. The committee consulted with, among others: Thomas C. MacDonald, Jr., a Tampa
attorney who served as counsel for the University of Florida; Jerry Tarkanian, head men's basket-
ball coach at the University of Nevada-Las Vegas; D. Alan Williams, current chairman of the
NCAA Committee on Infractions; Frank E. Remington, a former chair of the NCAA Committee
on Infractions; Beverly E. Ledbetter, current member of the NCAA Committee on Infractions,
Milton R. Schroeder, current member of the NCAA Committee on Infractions and David S.
Berst, NCAA assistant director for enforcement.
The Committee heard statements from: Britton B. Banowsky, assistant commissioner and
legal counsel, Southland Conference; J. Steven Becket, attorney, Champaign, Illinois; William C.
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rule change recommendations but did point out areas that needed
improvement.
Most importantly, the report recognizes the need for "procedurally
fair" enforcement. Unfortunately, "procedurally fair" is not defined by the
Committee. What is known is that "procedurally fair" does not reach the
level of "procedural due process." The Committee does not believe that the
NCAA is able or needs to comport with the constitutional procedural due
process requirements.15 5 Whether the NCAA will ever act on its Commit-
tee's recommendations remains to be seen. The NCAA has postponed con-
sideration of those recommendations until 1993.156
2. The NCAA Suit Against Nevada
What the NCAA has done is file suit in federal court against the State of
Nevada and Tarkanian. 157 The NCAA is seeking immediate injunctive re-
lief so that it can complete an infractions case which it is currently pursuing
against UNLV. In addition, the NCAA is seeking a court ruling that will
declare the Nevada procedural due process law unconstitutional. The
NCAA claims that the Nevada law is unconstitutional because it violates
the interstate commerce clause by extending Nevada laws beyond its bor-
der, violates the right of NCAA member institutions to freedom of associa-
tion, deprives NCAA institutions of their right to due process, is vague, and
Carr III, vice-president, GNI Sports, Inc., Charlotte, North Carolina (former director of athletics,
University of Florida); Collegiate Commissioners Association officers Thomas C. Hansen, com-
missioner, Pacific-10 Conference, and Thomas E. Yeager, commissioner, Colonial Athletic Con-
ference; Bill Curry, head football coach, University of Kentucky; James E. Delany, commissioner,
Big Ten Conference; Vincent J. Dooley, director of athletics, University of Georgia; George H.
Raveling, head men's basketball coach, University of Southern California, and member of the
board of directors of the National Association of Basketball Coaches; and Michael L. Slive, com-
missioner, Great Midwest Conference.
A number of written reports were received including suggestions from: Stanley 0. Ikenberry,
president of the University of Illinois System; Morton W. Weir, chancellor of the University of
Illinois, Champaign; Congressman Tom McMillen and George H. Gangwere, former NCAA gen-
eral counsel. Id at 2.
155. See id. at appendix.
156. The busy month of December forced the cancellation of the hearing scheduled for De-
cember 12, 1991 to discuss the Report and Recommendations of the Special Committee to Review
the NCAA Enforcement and Infractions Process. Busy Month Scuttles Enforcement Hearing,
THE NCAA NEWS, December 9, 1991, at 1; Asher, supra note 121, at B2.
157. Tom Withers, One Circus Comes, Another Goes As Tarkanian Closes the Rebel Show,
PROPRIETARY TO THE UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL, November 23, 1991, at Sports News;
NCAA Fights Back; Challenges Nevada, L.A. TIMES, November 13, 1991, at Cl. NCAA execu-
tive director states that this action is being taken "very reluctantly." "I say reluctantly because
the association since it was founded in 1906 has been in court many times, but this is only the
third time the NCAA has ever instituted legal action. We're doing it only as a last resort."
Arena, NEWSDAY, November 13, 1991, at 110.
MAR QUETE SPORTS LAW JOURNAL
interferes with the institutions' rights to freedom of contract.158 Ironically,
the NCAA fought all the way to the Supreme Court so that it would not be
required to comply with procedural due process and now the NCAA claims
in the same courts that its own right to procedural due process has been
violated.
The NCAA faces an uphill battle" 9 because there is a presumption of
constitutionality attached to state statutes. 6
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON STATE DUE PRocEss
STATUTES
A. Constitutional Due Process- What Process Is Due
The United States Constitution prohibits a state actor from depriving a
person of property without due process.161 The NCAA states that it is not
a state actor and that, in any event, its procedures comport with the proce-
dural due process requirements of the federal constitution.162 The Supreme
Court has left open the possibility that the NCAA could be a state actor in
certain circumstances.1 63 Thus, the question arises: what more, if anything,
would constitutional procedural due process require the NCAA to do?
The requirements of procedural due process are not settled. They will
depend upon the nature of the right being taken from the individual and the
necessity of protecting that right. The basic elements of procedural due
process are:
(1) adequate notice of the charges or basis for government action;
(2) a neutral decision-maker; (3) an opportunity to make an oral
presentation to the decision-maker; (4) an opportunity to present ev-
idence or witnesses to the decision-maker; (5) a chance to confront
and cross-examine witnesses or evidence to be used against the indi-
vidual; (6) the right to have an attorney present the individuals case
to the decision-maker; (7) a decision based on the record with a
statement of reasons for the decision. 64
158. NCAA Seeks ReliefFrom Nevada State Law, THE NCAA NEWS, November 18, 1991, at
1, 14.
159. New Nevada Law Doesn't Suit NCAA, USA TODAY, November 13, 1991, at IC (quoting
NCAA attorney James Beasley).
160. Id.
161. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
162. "'You'll find that the NCAA has more due process than any other all-volunteer institu-
tion, more than the ABA (American Bar Association), more than the AMA (American Medical
Association).'" Scott Homer, supra note 3, at C1 (quoting Dick Schultz, NCAA Executive
Director).
163. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 203 (1988).
164. NOWAK et al., supra note 23, at 484.
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The degree to which these elements are required will vary. Adequate
notice must inform the other party that an action is pending against
them. 16- What specific type of notice is required will depend upon the na-
ture of the right being deprived. As held in Greene v. Lindsey,166 posting an
eviction notice on an apartment door is insufficient, but in Texaco, Inc. v.
Short,1 67 notice of termination of mineral rights by publication was suffi-
cient. However, as previously discussed, the NCAA's notice to the accused
by letter certainly fulfills the due process notice requirement.
1 68
The requirement of a neutral decision maker is based on the principle
that "a fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process.
169
Yet, a neutral decision maker does not necessarily entitle the accused to a
jury. The purpose of this requirement is to prevent bias from infecting the
decision. The showing of bias must be clear and will usually succeed if the
decision maker will benefit monetarily from a decision. 7 '
The infractions decision is made by the Committee on Infractions inde-
pendently of the member institutions.17 The procedural due process re-
quirement is therefore satisfied. However, a problem could arise if one of
the members on that Committee or the NCAA was found to benefit from a
Committee decision.
Opportunities to make oral presentations and to present witnesses and
evidence to the Committee on Infractions are all currently provided for by
Additionally there are six other procedural safeguards which tend to appear only in con-
nection with criminal trials or formal judicial process of some type. Those are: (1) the
right to compulsory process of witnesses; (2) a right to pre-trial discovery of evidence; (3) a
public hearing; (4) a transcript of the proceedings; (5) a jury trial; (6) a burden of proof on
the government greater than a preponderance of the evidence standard.
Id.
165. As stated in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950),
fundamental to procedural due process is "notice reasonably calculated, under all circumstances,
to appraise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to
present their objections."
166. 456 U.S. 444 (1982).
167. 454 U.S. 516 (1982).
168. The notice requirement should not be confused with the termination notice requirement
in employment contracts with coaches and other employees.
169. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955).
170. Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564 (1973); Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57
(1972).
171. "Any member of the Committee on Infractions or Council who is directly connected
with an institution under inquiry shall not take part in any NCAA proceeding connected with the
case before the Committee or Council." NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION, supra
note 8, at 433 (explicating NCAA Administrative Bylaw Article 32 § 1.3). It should be noted that
this section does not prohibit representatives of rival institutions from taking part in the proceed-
ings. See also Administrative Bylaw Article 32 § 6.4.5, which allows a party prohibited from
attending to act as a witness at the invitation of the Committee. Id. at 440.
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existing NCAA enforcement procedures. 172 Nonetheless, the NCAA hear-
ings depart from the procedural due process requirements because of the
inability of the accused to cross-examine adverse witnesses.
As expressed in Mathews v. Eldridge, 173 due process does not always
require that a hearing be held before a party is deprived of certain rights.
However, when a hearing is conducted it is often required that the accused
be allowed to cross-examine the opponent's witnesses. Thus, in Goldberg v.
Kelly, 1 74 it was held that before termination of a person's welfare benefits,
he or she must have the right to confront and cross-examine adverse wit-
nesses. At issue, then, is the type of hearing that procedural due process
requires the NCAA to conduct. Goldberg v. Kelly held that, although a
"quasi-judicial trial" was not required, the right to cross-examine must still
be granted.'75 Other decisions do not require that right.176
The question of whether the NCAA should be required to allow cross-
examination is best answered by application of the balance test set forth in
Mathews v. Eldridge. 177 Three factors are considered by the Court in deter-
mining which procedures will be required.
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action;
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through
the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or
substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government inter-
est, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative
burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requisites would
entail. 178
There is no doubt that university representatives have a significant inter-
est in defending themselves in NCAA infractions proceedings. In addition,
the inability to cross-examine witnesses leaves open the possibility that sig-
nificant issues of credibility, completeness and competency will not be made
known. The NCAA Committee on Infractions could well be misled if the
interests of a witness are not presented to it. Accordingly, the NCAA dam-
ages substantial interests of the accused by not allowing cross-examination.
172. See NCAA Administrative Bylaw Article 32 § 6.5.2 which grants the right to opening
and closing arguments and § 6.5.5 which concerns the type of evidence which may be presented at
the hearing. Id. at 440-41.
173. 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (hearing need not be held until after the termination of disability
benefits).
174. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
175. Id. at 266.
176. E.g., Board of Curators v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78 (1978) (due process fulfilled in aca-
demic dismissal where student was informed and given opportunity to respond).
177. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
178. Id. at 335.
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The NCAA does not allow cross-examination of witnesses because it
claims that witnesses would not voluntarily appear if they were to be cross-
examined.179 The NCAA does not have subpoena power. Thus, if a wit-
ness will not voluntarily appear the NCAA cannot force the person to do
so. This could be a significant administrative burden on the NCAA. Alter-
natives might include giving the NCAA subpoena power through state leg-
islation or, at least, an agreement among the member institutions
empowering the NCAA to call their students and employees as wit-
nesses.' 8 The Supreme Court has often decided that a hearing is not re-
quired before the deprivation of a right.1 ' However, the inability to ever
cross-examine is a heavy impediment on the accused and, therefore, does
not comport with procedural due process.
The last two general elements of procedural due process call for the
right to representation by an attorney and the right to have a decision based
on a record with a statement of the reasons for the decision.' 82 These re-
quirements are fulfilled by the NCAA's current procedures. 83 State legis-
lation requiring these rights would therefore impose no additional burden
on the NCAA and would guarantee that the right to an attorney and the
right to a written statement based on the record are not impaired or
withdrawn.
The final element of procedural due process is the right of a party to
appeal a decision. Where a state agency acts, "[tihe arbitrary refusal to
allow individuals to use the established state court process would seem to be
invalid under even the most minimal due process or equal protection stan-
dards."' 84 Under NCAA rules, a party cannot appeal a decision of the
Committee on Infractions to the state courts.' 8 The Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Bounds v. Smith ' 86 held that access to the judicial process is funda-
mental in the criminal setting. The NCAA Committee on Infractions does
not, however, issue criminal sanctions. Other decisions show a general
179. Sherman, supra note 117, at 13C (quoting Richard Hillard, a NCAA Director of
Enforcement).
180. Such legislation or an agreement would very likely give the NCAA the kind of authority
over persons as to make it a state actor. See generally Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179 (1988).
181. See Board of Curators v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78 (1978).
182. NOWAK et al., supra note 23, at 484.
183. NCAA Administrative Bylaw Article 32 § 6.4.1 grants the right to have counsel at a
hearing, § 6.6.2 requires a finding on the information presented and § 7.1 entitles the accused to a
infractions report. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC AssOCIATION, supra note 8, at 439-42.
184. NOWAK et al., supra note 23, at 517 (citing Logan v. Zimmermann Brush Co., 455 U.S.
422 (1982)).
185. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION, supra note 8, at 443 (explicating
NCAA Administrative Bylaw Article 32 § 9).
186. 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977).
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right to access the civil court system.18 7 However, the right to access the
judicial system is not absolute. There are instances where the interest in
maintaining low cost and informal proceedings weighs against allowing ac-
cess to a full judicial proceedings. Such proceedings, like the NCAA's, will
probably withstand a procedural due process attack which is based solely
upon the fact that the NCAA does not allow access to the court system.18
Legislation granting such access requires a significant change in NCAA
procedures that is not required under the federal constitution.
B. State Due Process Statutes and Interstate Commerce
For reasons of maintaining an effective national economy, the federal
government holds the authority to regulate interstate commerce.'8 9 That
grant of power emanates from the commerce clause of the federal constitu-
tion.' 90 There are circumstances in which, even though the federal legisla-
tion has not preempted the state's legislation, the state is not permitted to
regulate commerce. 191 Generally, regulations that substantially burden in-
terstate commerce are not permitted and will be struck down by the
Supreme Court. 192
The state due process regulations are not preempted by federal law. 19
Thus, the NCAA will argue that state due process statutes burden interstate
commerce.' The threshold question is whether the NCAA is, in fact, en-
187. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
188. See Walters v. National Association of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 335 (1985)
(allowing limitation to representation in Veteran's Administration proceeding).
189. See TRIBE, supra note 15, at 403-08.
190. Id. at 403. The commerce clause states that "[t]he congress shall have Power... [t]o
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian
Tribes .... ." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
191. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941) (state statute which prohibited bringing non-
resident indigent persons into state violates the commerce clause).
192. Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959) (state law prohibiting certain
truck mudguards was a violation of the commerce clause where other states allowed those guards
and there was no significant safety benefit).
193. Although legislation creating NCAA procedural requirements is being considered by the
House of Representatives, no law has been enacted. Robbins, supra note 85, at C3.
194. [T]he NCAA is making noises about testing the constitutionality of [Illinois House
Bill 682] in court -not only in Illinois, but also in Nevada and Nebraska, where similar bills
have been passed. At issue is whether a state can regulate a national organization, one that
is voluntary to boot.
Sherman, supra note 117, at 13C.
In an interview John J. Kitchin, general counsel for the NCAA, emphasized to the author the
importance of uniform procedures within the NCAA and the burden conflicting state statutes
would place on the NCAA's national activities. Telephone Interview with John J. Kitchen,
NCAA General Counsel (June 1991). The NCAA has now filed a suit against the State of
Nevada.
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gaged in interstate commerce. The NCAA has an annual budget of
$160,600,000195 and members in almost every state.196 With such a na-
tional presence there is little doubt that the NCAA is engaged in interstate
commerce. 1
97
Engagement in interstate commerce will not automatically grant protec-
tion to the NCAA from the states' due process legislation. The principal
test applied to state due process legislation was expounded in Southern Pa-
cific Co. v. Arizona,198 which invalidated an Arizona state law limiting the
length of trains in that state. The decision emphasized a test that would
balance the state interest behind the regulation against the burden on inter-
state commerce. 199 Thus, the Court stated that the issue,
is whether in the circumstances the total effect of the law as a safety
measure in reducing accidents and casualties is so slight or problem-
atic as not to outweigh the national interest in keeping interstate
commerce free from interferences which seriously impede it and sub-
ject it to local regulation which does not have uniform effect .... 2 0
In the more recent Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp. 0 decision,
the Supreme Court overturned an Iowa statute which barred the use of
trucks with more than 60 foot single trailers or 65 foot double trailers on
Iowa interstate highways. The Court noted that the commerce clause is a
limitation on state action even where Congress has not acted.20 2 Highway
safety was traditionally a function of the state which would not be inter-
fered with unless the Court found the safety concerns illusory. 2°3 The
Court held, however, that the safety concern for long trucks was illusory2°4
and, therefore, overturned the statute.
195. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION, supra note 8, at 43.
196. See id. at 29-31.
197. For example, in NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma, et al., 468
U.S. 85 (1984), the NCAA's actions in putting together a television package for members was
found to violate the Sherman Antitrust Act.
198. 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
199. Id. at 775-76.
200. Id.
201. 450 U.S. 662 (1981).
202. Id. at 669 (citing Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising Conm'n, 432 U.S. 333
(1977)).
203. "[S]ome burdens associated with state safety regulations must be tolerated. But where,
as here, the State's safety interest has been found to be illusory, and its regulations impair signifi-
cantly the federal interest in effective and safe interstate transportation, the state law cannot be
harmonized with the Commerce Clause." Id at 671.
204. The Court made a detailed analysis of the safety variances between tandem and semi
units. Backing up ability and jack-knifing prevention favored the semi units. However, other
features such as braking, turning, maneuvering and off-tracking were better in a tandem unit.
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It is unlikely that the Supreme Court will find state concern for due
process illusory. Two compelling factors for the Kassel decision were that
the Iowa law was "out of step" with other safety laws2 °5 and that the Iowa
law contained exceptions which were advantageous only to Iowa residents.
Neither factor is present in state due process legislation relating to the
NCAA. Several states have taken it upon themselves to enact or propose
such laws20 6 and there are no exceptions for local entities. Nevertheless,
Kassel is a decision which invalidated a state statute. The burden in Kassel
was created by the inconsistency of Iowa law with the laws of other states
and the effect such inconsistency had on an entity with interstate opera-
tions. Multi-state due process legislation is likely to place a similar burden
on the NCAA.
State due process legislation will burden the NCAA because those laws
are inconsistent. The legislation passed by Nevada207 is different than that
passed by Illinois.2 °8 Even in states such as Florida and Illinois, where the
legislation is almost identical, the clauses which require the NCAA to apply
that state's evidentiary rules will require different procedures in each
state.20 9 It is these inconsistent standards that will create a burden on the
NCAA's interstate infractions activities. The issue is whether or not a
state's interest in protecting its schools and their coaches and athletes can
outweigh the burden the state legislation places on the NCAA.
State due process legislation does not discriminate in favor of athletic
associations operating within the state.210 In fact, the Nevada legislation is
claimed to burden an organization established in that state-the NCAA.
Therefore, state due process legislation will not be subject to strict scrutiny
by the Supreme Court.2"' The findings of a state legislature win be given
Thus, Iowa failed to establish its safety interest in prohibiting the larger tandem trucks because
"the twin is as safe as the semi." Id. at 672.
205. Id.
206. Florida, Nebraska, Nevada and Illinois have enacted due process legislation and several
other states are developing similar proposals. Jeff Shain, NCAA Seeks to Overturn Nevada State
Law, PROPRIETARY TO THE UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL, November 12, 1991, at Sports
News.
207. 1991 Nev. Stat. § 398.
208. H.B. 682, 87th Leg., 1991-1992 Illinois
209. H.B. 682 § 4(e), 87th Leg., 1991-1992 Illinois; S.B. 1104 § 4(5), 1991 Florida.
210. As noted earlier in section III.B., the definition in the due process legislation refers ge-
nerically to collegiate athletic associations and, since the NCAA is the only such organization, the
NCAA will not be discriminated against in favor of other institutions.
211. See Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941 (1982) (state restriction on the export of ground
water does not survive strictest scrutiny).
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deference by the Supreme Court2 12 and the fact that the NCAA is a na-
tional monopoly should justify the placing of the burden upon it.
Nevertheless, the state due process legislation may not pass the High
Court's review. As held in Flood v. Kuhn 213 and Partee v. San Diego Charg-
ers Football Co.,214 even a state's interest in enforcing antitrust laws does
not allow it to regulate professional sports because of the burden on the
sports associations' interstate activities. Likewise, a state's interest in pro-
tecting its schools and their coaches and athletes with due process legisla-
tion may not outweigh the burden such legislation will place on the
NCAA's interstate infractions activities.215
It must also be recognized that the burden upon the NCAA is limited.
The NCAA infractions proceedings are not like a train or truck which trav-
els through states. Infractions proceedings against a particular institution
occur only within one state. The NCAA serves member institutions in
many states in the same manner that any large corporation serves consum-
ers in many states. The NCAA must, as would any large corporation
bringing or defending a suit within a particular state, adhere to the constitu-
tionally sound laws of that state.
V. A MODEL FOR NCAA REFORM
What follows are specific rules which the NCAA should adopt without
delay. They are implementable and will create procedural fairness without
stifling the infractions process.
1. No charge shall be brought unless it is within two years of the
date of the act upon which the charge is based. Evidence of acts
prior to two years before the date of the act upon which the claim is
based may be presented to show a pattern of infractions.
2. All pretrial witness testimony shall be recorded and such re-
cording shall be available to all parties.
212. See Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1981) (to preserve environ-
ment state may ban the sale of plastic milk containers).
213. 407 U.S. 258 (1972) (holding state antitrust law was not applicable against professional
baseball on alternate grounds of preemption and unreasonable burden upon interstate commerce)
214. 34 Cal. 3d 378, 668 P.2d 674, 194 Cal. Rptr. 367 (1983) (holding state antitrust laws
were not applicable against the National Football League).
215. From a practical standpoint, the Illinois bill would cause havoc within the NCAA.
If every state passes the bill, the NCAA would find itself having 50 different sets of regula-
tions for conducting an investigation. "Someone might say, 'It's not fair to do it this way
in state X, because they do it this way in state Y,' .... There would be a real mishmash of
conflicts arising all over the place."
Sherman, supra note 117, at 13C (quoting John J. Kitchen, general counsel for the NCAA). Also
burdensome is applying the correct law when the NCAA interviews a witness from out of state.
Id.
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3. All witnesses shall be allowed the presence of counsel.
4. The hearing shall be conducted as a formal trial with evidence
presented to a three-judge panel which makes a written decision
based upon the facts in evidence.
5. The three-judge panel shall be made up of former judges or emi-
nent legal authorities who are not members of the NCAA Infrac-
tions Committee.
6. The NCAA Infractions Committee shall show by clear and con-
vincing evidence that the accused is guilty as charged for a finding of
a violation.
7. All witnesses shall be subject to cross-examination.
8. All NCAA institutions' employees and players shall testify at
the request of a party.
9. All testimony shall be made under oath.
10. All parties shall have the right to appeal to a single judge who
may only remand for a new trial if that judge finds that there is new
evidence or that the procedure in the trial was flawed such that it
was fundamentally unfair.
In addition, states should grant subpoena power to the NCAA over all
persons the NCAA reasonably requires to testify at an infractions hearing.
VI. CONCLUSION
The NCAA infractions process needs reform. The failure of the NCAA
to provide a recording of interviews, cross-examination and a meaningful
appeals process is improper and does not comport with constitutional pro-
cedural due process. Yet, in other areas the NCAA infractions process goes
well beyond the requirements of procedural due process.
Criticism of the NCAA's infractions procedures has for too long been
dismissed as the whining of cheaters. The NCAA infractions procedures
cannot be allowed to continue as they stand if the NCAA is to maintain its
credibility. Our student-athletes, their coaches, and the public must have
the assurance that sanctions are not the result of misguided or malicious
prosecution. Little can be said for a system that does not grant its own
members their fundamental rights.
State legislatures are reacting in a rapid and varied manner to impose
procedural due process requirements upon the NCAA. If the purpose of
such legislation is to force the NCAA to catch the rule breakers-and only
the rule breakers-then a compromise should be found that will allow for
NCAA procedural reform while maintaining national uniformity.
If the NCAA is to return to our nation the confidence that "college ball
is college ball," infractions proceedings must be smooth, uniform, and full
of integrity. Reform cannot come without action. No change would be as
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significant as that which is caused by the NCAA itself. However, time has
shown that to guarantee to athletes, coaches, and schools the right to fair
infractions proceedings, states must take action.
AIDAN MIDDLEMISS MCCORMACK

